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NOTES
WHITE V. STATE: RAISING THE STAKES OF
STATE TORT CLAIMS
Michael P. Heringer
I. INTRODUCTION
Article II, section 18 of the 1972 Montana Constitution abol-
ished governmental immunity in Montana.1 Prior to its adoption,
the Montana Supreme Court had qualified the extent of govern-
mental immunity when it stated: "It is beyond question in this ju-
risdiction that the state cannot be sued without its consent."'2 Ef-
fective in 1975, article II, section 18 was amended to permit
governmental immunity to be granted by a two-thirds vote of the
Montana Legislature.3 This amendment essentially provided the
legislature with the means to limit government liability in tort.
In 1977, the legislature used this power to adopt a statute bar-
ring recovery of noneconomic damages and limiting recovery of ec-
onomic damages." The legislature also enacted a statute that bars
recovery of punitive damages against any governmental entity.5
In White v. State,6 a 1983 case, the Montana Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the statute barring recovery of
noneconomic damages and limiting recovery of economic damages.
As a result, governmental entities were once again confronted with
the reality of unlimited liability. The legislature responded imme-
diately by passing an act 7 that includes a new damage limitation
statute that does not distinguish between economic and
1. In its original form, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18 provided: "The state, counties, cities,
towns and all other governmental entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to
person or property. This provision shall only apply to causes of action arising after July 1,
1973."
2. Coldwater v. State Highway Comm'n, 118 Mont. 65, 74, 162 P.2d 772, 776 (1945).
3. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18 currently provides:
The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities shall
have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or property, except as may be
specifically provided by a 3 vote of each house of the legislature. (emphasis
added).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-104 (1981) (repealed 1983).
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-105 (1983).
6. - Mont. - , 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
7. Act of Apr. 29, 1983, ch. 675, 1983 Mont. Laws 1615.
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noneconomic damages.8 The statute does, however, continue to
limit the amount of liability to each claimant and for each
occurrence.
9
This note will examine pre- White legislation and judicial deci-
sions that have affected the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
Montana. This note will also analyze the White decision and the
legislative response, and explore the practical implications of sov-
ereign immunity in Montana.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Enactments
In 1973, after the Montana Constitution had abolished govern-
mental immunity, the legislature enacted the Montana Compre-
hensive State Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims
Act).10 This Act designates which governmental entities are re-
sponsible for procuring insurance, sets out the procedure a claim-
ant must follow to bring an action, and provides limitations on
venue and the time for filing claims. Only one provision of the orig-
inal Tort Claims Act restricted the government's unlimited liabil-
ity exposure. That statute barred recovery of attorney's fees, inter-
est, or punitive damages from any governmental entity."
In 1977, changes in the Tort Claims Act created significant
limitations on governmental liability. Specific government officers,
agents, and employees-including members of the state legisla-
ture,12 members of the judiciary," the governor, and local elected
executives 15-were granted immunity "from suit for damages aris-
ing from the lawful discharge of an official duty."' 6 Other changes
provided that a court could regulate attorney's fees,' 7 and permit-
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-107 (1983).
9. For text of statute, see infra note 76.
10. Montana Comprehensive State Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act, ch. 380, 1973
Mont. Laws 753 (codified as amended at MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 82-4301 to -4335
(1947)). The Act, as amended, is currently codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-9-101 to -318
(1983). The official title of the original Act, given in MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 82-4301
(1947), is no longer used in the current statutes, but courts and attorneys continue to refer
to Montana's "Tort Claims Act." This note will do the same.
11. MoNT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 82-4324 (1947).
12. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-111(3) (1983).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-112(2) (1983).
14. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-113 (1983).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-114 (1983).
16. This language is quoted from and common to §§ 2-9-111 to -114.
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-314 (1983) requires any attorney seeking compensation
from the state to file a contract of employment showing the fee arrangement between attor-
[Vol. 45
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ted interest to accrue on a judgment not satisfied within a two-year
period. 18
The legislature also adopted two provisions limiting liability
for damages. The first keeps intact the bar on punitive damages.'9
The second-the statute found unconstitutional in White-barred
recovery of noneconomic damages and limited recovery of eco-
nomic damages to "$300,000 for each claimant and $1 million for
each occurrence.20 For the purposes of the latter statute, the Tort
Claims Act defined economic damages as "tangible pecuniary
losses. 12 1 Noneconomic damages were defined as "those damages
not included in economic, punitive, or exemplary damages includ-
ing, without limitation, damages for pain and suffering, loss of con-
sortium, mental distress, and loss of reputation. '22
B. Case Law
1. Prosecutorial Immunity
In the absence of statutory provision, the Montana Supreme
Court has granted immunity to public officials when the public
need weighs heavily in favor of such a policy.22 In State ex rel.
Department of Justice v. District Court,2 ' the court recognized
prosecutorial immunity as an issue distinct from sovereign immu-
nity. The case involved two separate malicious prosecution claims
against the Attorney General, Department of Justice, and State of
Montana. The supreme court reversed the district court denials of
motions to dismiss, and held that the prosecution was immune
from suit. After distinguishing prosecutorial immunity from sover-
eign immunity, the court held that article II, section 18 did not
ney and client; this contract becomes part of the court record. The district court has the
power to regulate the attorney's fee. If the attorney violates the stated conditions, "he for-
feits the right to any fee which he may have collected or been entitled to collect." Id.
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-317 (1983).
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-105 (1983) provides: "The state and other governmental
entities are immune from exemplary and punitive damages."
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-104 (1981) (repealed 1983). The statute provided in part:
(1) Neither the state, a county, municipality, taxing district, nor any other politi-
cal subdivision of the state is liable for:
(a) noneconomic damages; or
(b) economic damages suffered as a result of an act or omission of an
officer, agent, or employee of that entity in excess of $300,000 for each
claimant and $1 million for each occurrence.
21. MONT. CoDE ANN. § 2-9-101(2)(a) (1981) (repealed 1983).
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-101(2)(b) (1981) (repealed 1983).
23. Orser v. State, 178 Mont. 126, 131, 582 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1978).
24. 172 Mont. 88, 560 P.2d 1328 (1976).
1984]
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abolish prosecutorial immunity, and that the Tort Claims Act does
not affect it. The court based its decision on the public need for
free and independent judicial and quasi-judicial officers. 25 The su-
preme court has not specifically ruled whether county or city attor-
neys have similar immunity, but it is likely that the same policy
reasons would apply and that prosecutorial immunity would be ex-
tended to them as well.
2. Limitations on Prosecutorial Immunity
There are limits to the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. In
Orser v. State,26 the plaintiff brought an action against the state
and two game wardens for malicious prosecution. In its defense,
the state argued that game wardens should be included among
those who enjoy prosecutorial immunity, citing a California deci-
sion2 7 as precedent. The court rejected the California rationale as
nonrepresentative of prior rulings on immunity for law enforce-
ment personnel, and held that the state must accept responsibility
for the tortious acts of its game wardens that fall within the course
and scope of their employment. In Orser, the game wardens acted
within their authority and had probable cause to arrest the plain-
tiff; thus the state was not held liable. The court, however, made it
clear that absolute immunity does not necessarily apply to all state
employees whose function is to aid in the enforcement of criminal
law.
In State v. District Court2 8 plaintiff alleged that he suffered
permanent brain damage because city policemen had failed to take
him to a hospital for medical care after he had been beaten in a
barroom fight. The supreme court reversed the district court's
finding that the state was liable for the officers' actions. In reach-
ing its decision, the court overruled two pre-1972 cases that held
the state responsible for city policemen. 29 The court noted that the
25. The court based its position on the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court:
"If the prosecutor must weigh the possibilities of precipitating tort litigation involving the
county and the state against his action in any criminal case, his freedom and independence
in proceeding with criminal prosecutions will be at an end." Id. at 92, 560 P.2d at 1330
(quoting Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 885, 410 P.2d 606, 608 (1966)).
26. 178 Mont. 126, 582 P.2d 1227 (1978).
27. In White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951), the California Supreme
Court ruled that a game warden as a law enforcement officer "is entitled to immunity from
civil liability [for malicious prosecution] with which the law surrounds officials directly con-
nected with the judicial process." Id. at 730, 235 P.2d at 211.
28. 170 Mont. 15, 550 P.2d 382 (1976).
29. The first decision, Kingfisher v. City of Forsythe, 132 Mont. 39, 314 P.2d 876
(1957), held that a city policeman was an agent for the state. A later decision, Boettger v.
Empire Liab. Assurance Corp., 158 Mont. 258, 490 P.2d 717 (1971), noted that there was not
[Vol. 45
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intent of the Tort Claims Act was to make cities and other political
subdivisions, rather than the state, responsible for the tortious acts
of their employees. In this case the state exercised no direct, de-
tailed, or daily supervision over city policemen and was powerless
to prevent their negligent acts. The court cited the power to hire
and fire an employee as the most significant factor in determining
which governmental entity would be held responsible.30
3. Indemnification
A governmental entity is obligated to indemnify its employees
in the event one of them is sued in tort. 1 Thus an individual em-
ployee enjoys personal immunity for tortious acts or omissions
committed within the course and scope of his employment, and the
plaintiff has no recourse against the party who actually caused the
injury. Such personal immunity may be contrary to the principles
of agency law that typically apply to employer-employee relation-
ships. In agency law, although the principal is liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior, "the agent is personally liable for his
own tortious act."
3 2
A government employee, however, is personally liable for cer-
tain types of malicious or fraudulent conduct, even if committed
within the course and scope of employment.3 3 In Orser, the court
ruled that game wardens were not personally immune from suit for
malicious prosecution, because such conduct fell within the statu-
tory exception for intentional torts. 4
In Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation District,35 two em-
ployees of an irrigation district (a governmental entity) failed to
provide water to the plaintiff in violation of state law. The court
held that the statutes that barred recovery of noneconomic dam-
ages and limited economic damages did not apply to the individual
defendants. The statutes only apply to the state and other govern-
mental entities. Individual government employees can also be held
responsible for punitive damages.3 6
a principal-agent relationship between a city and its policemen.
30. State v. District Court, 170 Mont. at 20, 550 P.2d at 384.
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (1983).
32. Wyse, A Framework of Analysis for the Law of Agency, 40 MONT. L. REv. 31, 38
(1979).
33. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305(6) (1983).
34. Orser, 178 Mont. at 135, 582 P.2d at 1232.
35. - Mont. -, 639 P.2d 62 (1981).
36. Id. at -, 639 P.2d at 66.
19841
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4. Duty of Care
In B.M. v. State 7 a minor, through her foster mother, brought
a claim for damages arising from her placement in a special educa-
tion program when she was six years old. Although the child had
an IQ of seventy-six, with the approval of the state superintendent
she was placed in a program for children with IQ's from fifty to
seventy-five.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision that the
superintendent's actions were not subject to judicial review be-
cause they were discretionary in nature."8 The court based its hold-
ing on the fact that the Constitution had abolished governmental
immunity except in situations where the legislature had by a two-
thirds vote enacted contrary legislation. According to statute,
"[e]very governmental entity is subject to liability for its torts and
those of its employees . . . whether arising out of a governmental
or proprietary function except as specifically provided by the legis-
lature . . . ." Since the legislature had not enacted specific legis-
lation to limit the liability of school boards in the administration
of special education programs, educators and the entities that em-
ploy them can be held liable for negligence.
The court further held that the state owes a "duty of care to
special education students."40 This duty of care is founded on prin-
ciples of public policy, 41 the Montana Constitution,42 and statutory
law.43
37. - Mont. -, 649 P.2d 425 (1982).
38. The distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions was important in
Montana until the adoption of the 1972 Constitution. See, e.g., Comment, The Passing of
Sovereign Immunity in Montana: The King is Dead!, 34 MONT. L. REv. 283, 290 n.59
(1973): "As a general proposition, immunity attaches to governmental and discretionary
functions and liability attaches to proprietary and ministerial functions."
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-102 (1983).
40. B.M. v. State, - Mont. at -, 649 P.2d at 427.
41. The court concluded: "[I]n the absence of a clear statutory declaration granting
immunity, it is our duty to permit rather than deny an action for negligence." Id.
42. MONT. CONsT. art. X, § 1 provides in part: "It is the goal of the people to establish
a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state."
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (1983) makes attendance at a state-approved school
mandatory. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-402 (1983) provides that school districts shall comply
with policies recommended by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction in adminis-
tering special education programs.
Justice Sheehy did not agree that the state owes a duty of care to special education
students. B.M. v. State, - Mont. at -, 649 P.2d at 429 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). He
noted that other courts in similar situations have held that educators and school districts do
not owe a duty of care to participants in special education programs. See D.S.W. v. Fair-
banks North Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Smith v. Alameda
County Social Services Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979); Hoffman v.
[Vol. 45
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5. Interest on a Judgment
The Tort Claims Act states that "[ijf a governmental entity
pays a judgment within 2 years after the day on which the judg-
ment is entered, no penalty or interest may be assessed against the
governmental entity."" In Jacques v. State, 6 where the state was
held liable for injuries to plaintiff when a Montana National Guard
artillery shell exploded, the court held that the interest statute is
constitutional. Interest, not being a detriment arising from the
wrongful act, could be suspended by statute. 46 The statute allows
governmental entities sufficient time to appropriate the funds nec-
essary to satisfy a judgment.
6. Failure to Pay a Claim
Although the Tort Claims Act limits the amount of damages a
claimant can recover from a governmental entity, there is a possi-
bility that a governmental entity will be unable to satisfy a judg-
ment against it. Thus the issue arises: What are the plaintiff's al-
ternatives in the event a governmental entity fails to satisfy a
judgment? That question has never been entertained by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court in a tort action.
In First National Bank v. Sourdough Land & Cattle Co.,47
plaintiff bank brought an action against defendant because defen-
dant sought to satisfy a judgment against the state for breach of
contract by garnishing state funds in the bank's possession. The
court held that, in a contract dispute, state funds are not subject
to execution. The court concluded that a judgment should be paid
from funds appropriated by the legislative session next succeeding
the date of the judgment, not including special sessions.48
While First National Bank was a contract case, the Tort
Claims Act indicates the same solution for tort claims. The Act
states that "[n]o levy of attachment or writ of execution shall issue
against any property of a governmental entity for the security or
collection of any claim or judgment against any governmental en-
tity . . . . 49
Bd. of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-317 (1983).
45. - Mont. -, 649 P.2d 1319 (1982).
46. Id. at - , 649 P.2d at 1327.
47. 171 Mont. 390, 558 P.2d 654 (1976).
48. Id. at 398, 558 P.2d at 658.
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-318 (1983).
1984]
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III. WHITE V. STATE
A. The Facts
Karla White, the plaintiff, alleged that on Sept. 1, 1977, she
was attacked and injured by an escapee from Warm Springs State
Hospital. She contended that the state negligently permitted the
inmate to escape from a state institution and remain free for five
years, until the date of the attack. Because most of her damages
were noneconomic in nature, White argued that the statutes that
barred recovery of noneconomic and punitive damages, and limited
economic damages, were unconstitutional. 0 The district court
found these statutes unconstitutional and granted summary judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff. From that decision the State of Montana
appealed.
B. The Decision
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed in part the lower court
decision, holding that the statute that barred recovery of
noneconomic damages violated plaintiff's constitutional right of
equal protection. The court also held that the statute barring re-
covery of punitive damages did not violate plaintiff's constitutional
rights.
C. Analysis
1. Recovery of Noneconomic Damages
Without expressly adopting plaintiff's equal protection argu-
ment,8 ' the court noted that provisions in the United States and
50. See supra notes 19 & 20.
51. Plaintiff argued that MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-104 (1981) (repealed 1983) denied
her right to equal protection because:
1. It classifies victims of negligence who have sustained noneconomic damages by
whether they have been injured by a nongovernment tort-feasor or a government
tort-feasor. It totally denies any recovery to the latter class.
2. It classifies victims of government tort-feasors by whether they have suffered
economic damages or noneconomic damages. It allows recovery to the former
group up to $300,000 while it totally denies recovery to the latter group.
3. It classifies victims of government tort-feasors by the severity of the victims'
injuries. It grants recovery to those victims who have not sustained significant
injury by allowing them to recover up to $300,000 in economic damages. It dis-
criminates against the seriously injured victims by denying recovery for any inju-
ries over $300,000.
White, - Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 1274.
[Vol. 45
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Montana Constitutions guarantee that "all persons. . . be treated
alike under like circumstances. 52 The court concluded that section
2-9-104 of the 1981 Montana Code Annotated violated plaintiff's
right of equal protection, because a statute "cannot discriminate
between those who suffer pain and loss of life quality and those
who primarily suffer economically.
53
In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the right to a
speedy remedy for every injury is a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Montana Constitution." Since the statute at issue affected
a fundamental right, a "strict scrutiny" test had to be applied.
When this test is applied, the statute will "be found unconstitu-
tional unless the State can demonstrate that such law is necessary
'to promote a compelling government interest.'"5
The state argued that the privilege to bring a suit for injuries
does not involve a fundamental right and therefore the statute had
to be judged by the "rational basis" test." In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court cited Corrigan v. Janney,7 in which it held that
"it is 'patently unconstitutional' for the legislature to pass a stat-
ute which denies a certain class of Montana citizens their causes of
action for personal injury and wrongful death.""
The state further contended that the preservation of its trea-
sury and the fact that government must engage in various poten-
tially dangerous activities constitute a compelling state interest
justifying immunity for noneconomic damages. The court noted
that the state has a valid interest in protecting its treasury, but
reasoned that "payment of tort judgments is simply a cost of doing
business."" The court concluded that the state had not satisfied
the strict scrutiny test; therefore immunity from liability for
noneconomic damages was unconstitutional.
The court went on to determine that the entire statute was
unconstitutional. Former section 2-9-104 both barred recovery of
noneconomic damages and restricted recovery of economic dam-
ages to "$300,000 for each claimant and $1 million for each occur-
rence." If only the part barring noneconomic damages were elimi-
nated, the remainder of the statute would discriminate against
those who suffer economic losses, since only damages for the latter
52. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Mor. CONST. art. I, § 4.
53. White, __ Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 1275.
54. Id. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
55. White, __ Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 1274.
56. Id.
57. - Mont. -, 626 P.2d 838 (1981).
58. White, - Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 1275.
59. Id.
1984]
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would be limited.
2. Punitive Damages
The court held that the right to recover punitive damages is
not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus it
applied a rational basis test to plaintiff's claim that section 2-9-
105, which provides governmental immunity from punitive dam-
ages, violated her right to equal protection. Plaintiff unsuccessfully
argued that "without the threat of punitive damages, the govern-
ment will be free to flagrantly violate constitutional or important
rights without fear of punishment."60 The court found that a ra-
tional basis existed for granting governmental immunity from pu-
nitive damages, noting that smaller political subdivisions would be
more vulnerable to financial catastrophe if an injured party were
permitted to recover punitive damages. The court also stated:
The primary purpose of assessing punitives is to punish the
wrongdoer and through that punishment, deter future conduct of
the tort-feasor and others who might be inclined to engage in like
conduct. The problem with assessing punitive damages against
the government is that the deterrent effect is extremely remote
and innocent taxpayers are, in fact, the ones punished."'
D. The Dissents
Three justices concurred in the majority opinion. Justice Gul-
brandson, concurring in part, agreed that governmental entities are
immune from punitive damages and that noneconomic damages
should be recoverable. 2 He dissented, however, from that part of
the opinion eliminating the economic damage limitation, because
in his view that issue was not before the court. He proposed that
the court should find the stated dollar limitations of former section
2-9-104 applicable to both economic and noneconomic losses.63
Justice Weber, joined by Chief Justice Haswell, had more seri-
ous reservations about the majority's resolution of the equal pro-
tection argument." In a strong dissent, Justice Weber stated that
the right to a speedy remedy, guaranteed by the Montana Consti-
60. Brief for Respondent at 62.
61. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 1276.
62. Id. (Gulbrandson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 1277 (Gulbrandson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
64. Id. (Weber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160 [Vol. 45
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tution, 6 "does not contain a grant of a fundamental right. As a
result the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the classification
is arbitrary. Plaintiff has not met that burden." '66 He also con-
tended that the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited from
eliminating a common law right, as it did when it enacted a law
barring recovery of noneconomic damages and limiting recovery of
economic damages. Finally, Justice Weber pointed out that the
legislature is constitutionally empowered to grant governmental
immunity by a two-thirds vote of each house.
In support of his position, Justice Weber cited several cases
holding that the legislature may restrict an individual's access to
the courts. In Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co.68 plaintiff, an in-
jured miner, argued that his constitutional right of access to the
courts was denied because of the limited right of recovery estab-
lished by the Industrial Accident Board. The court held that the
legislature may abolish common law remedies-e.g. an action for
injuries arising from negligence-"so long as there is no impair-
ment of rights already accrued." '69
A more recent case, Reeves v. Ille Electric Co.,70 reiterated the
Shea holding. Plaintiff argued that a statute7 ' requiring an action
for damages resulting from improvements to real property to be
brought within ten years after completion of the improvements
was unconstitutional, because it denied him access to the courts
and a speedy remedy for injuries. The court concluded that "the
legislature is not constitutionally prohibited from eliminating a
common law right as it did in Shea . . .
In Linder v. Smith7 3 plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of
the Montana Medical Malpractice Panel Act 74 on the ground that
it denied him the right of access to the courts in violation of his
constitutional rights. The court noted that "access to the courts is
65. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 provides in part: "Courts of justice shall be open to
every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or
character."
66. White, - Mont. at - , 661 P.2d at 1281 (Weber, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
67. Id. See supra note 3.
68. 55 Mont. 522, 179 P. 499 (1919).
69. Id. at 534, 179 P. at 503.
70. 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976).
71. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208 (1983).
72. Reeves, 170 Mont. at 110, 551 P.2d at 651.
73. - Mont. -, 629 P.2d 1187 (1981).
74. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-101 to -704 (1983). The name of this Act was changed
to the "Montana Medical Legal Panel Act" in 1983. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-101
(1983).
1984]
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not an independent fundamental right; access is only given such a
status when another fundamental right .. is at issue, and no al-
ternative form exists in which to enforce that right."'71
The White case can probably be construed to be consistent
with the prior cases. Although earlier case law held that access to
the courts is not an independent fundamental right by itself, the
White majority held that plaintiff also had a constitutional right to
a speedy remedy for all her injuries. Therefore two constitutional
rights were at stake. Also, unlike in Shea and Linder, White did
not have an alternative forum in which to enforce her claim for
noneconomic damages.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO WHITE
In response to White, the 1983 legislature enacted a new tem-
porary damage limitation statute that does not distinguish be-
tween economic and noneconomic damages. 76 The dollar limitation
was maintained and thus applies to both kinds of damages. It is
important to note that the statute terminates on June 30, 1985.11
The legislature cited several reasons for readopting a damages
limitation. Unlimited liability makes it increasingly difficult if not
impossible for governmental entities to purchase adequate insur-
ance coverage at a reasonable cost."' Certain essential government
functions carry inherently great risks.7 9 Finally, unlimited liability
for tort damages could have a profound effect in the reduction in
governmental revenues and "would eventually have the effect of
reallocating state resources to a degree that would result in invol-
untary choices between critical state and local programs."80
75. Linder, - Mont. at - , 629 P.2d at 1190.
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-107 (1983) provides:
(1) Neither the state, a county, municipality, taxing district, nor any other politi-
cal subdivision of the state is liable in tort action for damages suffered as a result
of an act or omission of an officer, agent, or employee of that entity in excess of
$300,000 for each claimant and $1 million for each occurrence.
(2) No insurer is liable for excess damages unless such insurer specifically agrees
by written endorsement to provide coverage to the governmental agency involved
in amounts in excess of a limitation stated in this section, in which case the in-
surer may not claim the benefits of the limitation specifically waived.
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-107 also applies retroactively to all claims arising after
July 1, 1977. See Act of Apr. 29, 1983, ch. 675, §§ 7-9, 1983 Mont. Laws 1619.
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-106(1) (1983).
79. These functions include responsibility for criminals and mental patients, construc-
tion and maintenance of highways, operation of transportation systems and airports, and
operation of schools and athletic facilities. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-106(2) (1983).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-106(3) (1983). Enacted as part of the response to White, §
2-9-106 contains an unusually long explanation of legislative purposes. These purposes are
stated in the form of legislative findings, the conclusion of which is also expressly stated:
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To determine whether these reasons justify any limitation on
governmental liability, the limitation must be analyzed in relation
to the practical implications of sovereign immunity in Montana.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
A. The State
The legislature's contention that the state is unable to
purchase adequate insurance is undoubtedly true. The Department
of Administration, the state agency responsible for procuring in-
surance, has been unable to find an insurance company that would
write a policy providing adequate coverage for the state.8 l As a re-
sult the state has been self-insured since 1977.
For fiscal 1983, the legislature appropriated an estimated
$1,500,000 to pay for claims against the state. An estimated
$750,000 was also appropriated for catastrophic or unexpected
claims.8 2 The state actually paid $2,300,000 in claims for the same
fiscal year. As of Sept. 1983, 625 claims had been filed against the
state since 1977, of which 185 went to trial.88
The abolishment of sovereign immunity has obviously cost
Montana taxpayers a great deal of money. Whether this cost to the
state treasury constitutes a "compelling interest" justifying the
damages limitation, however, is not clear. The cost of relaxing gov-
ernmental immunity is but a small percentage of the total state
budget.8 4 And, as the court noted in White, the payment of claims
is simply "a cost of doing business." 85 The White majority further
acknowledged that "there is no evidence in the record that the
payment of such claims would impair the State's ability to func-
tion as a governmental entity or create a financial crisis."8
"forced reduction in critical governmental services that could result from unlimited liability
... constitutes a compelling state interest requiring the application of the limitations on
liability and damages" found in § 2-9-107 and elsewhere in the Tort Claims Act. Whether
the Montana Supreme Court will agree with this "compelling state interest" analysis is of
course another question.
81. Telephone interview with J. Michael Young, Gen. Counsel, Insurance and Legal
Division, Montana Dep't of Admin. (Sept. 16, 1983).
82. Id. These figures do not include automobile and aircraft insurance, which is car-
ried by a private insurance company at an estimated annual cost of $300,000. Also, civil
rights claims are not included.
83. Id.
84. The executive budget proposed to spend $597,900,000 of the general fund during
the 1983 biennium. BUDGET ANALYSIS 1983 BIENNIUM 2 (1981).
85. White, __ Mont. at - , 661 P.2d at 1275.
86. Id.
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B. Political Subdivisions
The practical implications of governmental immunity apply
not only to the state, but also to all political subdivisions. 7 Several
political subdivisions expressed their concern about the White
case, and its possible repercussions on them, by submitting amicus
curiae briefs to the supreme court arguing for the state against
White.
The County of Yellowstone, the City of Billings, and the Mon-
tana League of Cities and Towns argued that "[t]he threat of un-
limited liability creates realistic concerns of unmanageable
financial burdens on local governments.""' They went on to point
out that political subdivisions face a greater possibility of economic
disaster than the state, because smaller entities have a limited tax
base from which they can accumulate funds to satisfy claims.8 9
C. Legislative Alternatives
The damage limitation statute adopted by the 1983 legislature
will terminate on June 30, 1985.90 The legislature will have to pass
a new statute or all governmental entities will be faced with unlim-
ited liability. In light of White, the legislature has three alterna-
tives. It can readopt the current liability limitation; let the current
statute lapse and thus incur unlimited liability; or pass a new law
that increases or decreases the amount of damages allowed.
The legislature has indicated its intent to limit governmental
liability; the House and Senate votes in favor of new section 2-9-
107 were overwhelming.9' The 1985 legislature will therefore prob-
ably either readopt the current liability limitation or change the
amount of damages allowed.
In 1972 Montana was a leader in relaxing the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.9 2 Today, however, the state can be categorized as
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-101(5) (1983) defines a political subdivision as "any
county, city, municipal corporation, school district, special improvement or taxing district,
or any other political subdivision or public corporation."
88. Amicus Curiae Brief of the County of Yellowstone, the City of Billings, and the
Montana League of Cities and Towns at 5, White v. State, - Mont. - , 661 P.2d 1272
(1983).
89. Id. An amicus curiae brief was also submitted by the County of Cascade and City
of Great Falls.
90. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
91. The vote on Senate Bill 465 in the Senate was 44-3, with two members excused
and one not voting. MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SENATE JOURNAL, 48th Seass. 1623
(1983). The vote in the House was 91-5, with four members excused. MONTANA LEGISLATiVE
COUNCIL, HousE JOURNAL, 48th Sess. 2343 (1983).
92. At that time Montana was the only jurisdiction that had absolutely abolished the
doctrine of sovereign immunity by constitutional provision. See Comment, supra note 38, at
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"middle of the road" compared to other states in the region. Cali-
fornia93 and Washington have constitutionally abolished govern-
mental immunity, subject to limitations enacted by their respec-
tive legislatures. Neither state has limited by statute the amount of
damages recoverable from the state. Oregon" and Idaho 6 have en-
acted laws limiting such recovery. Neither state explicitly distin-
guishes between economic and noneconomic damages.
Montana's damages limitation appears to be more liberal than
that of most other jurisdictions. 7 It is arguable that it should be,
because the framers intended article II, section 18 to provide re-
dress for all victims of governmental or private torts.99 Also, the
supreme court has construed the purpose of the Tort Claims Act to
be to attach liability to the state in the same manner and to the
same extent that liability is attached to a private citizen.99
VI. CONCLUSION
The status of governmental immunity in Montana is far from
settled. Some legislative and judicial trends, however, have
emerged. The legislature appears intent on limiting governmental
liability for damages and for specific governmental entities and
employees. The Montana Supreme Court, meanwhile, has held
that governmental entities and their employees can be held liable
in tort, except in situations where the legislature has specifically
granted immunity. The court continues to recognize the rule that
some government entities and their agents are protected from tort
283.
93. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5.
94. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 26.
95. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (1983). Oregon limits recovery of damages arising out of a
single accident or occurrence to $50,000 for property damages per claimant, and $100,000 for
all other damages per claimant, up to a maximum of $300,000 for all claims arising out of a
single act or occurrence.
96. IDAHO CODE § 6-926 (1979). Idaho limits recovery to $100,000 for all claims of
property damage arising out of one occurrence, and $100,000 per person for death or per-
sonal injury claims, up to a maximum of $300,000 for all death or personal injury claims per
occurrence. The Idaho statute adds that if a governmental entity has purchased liability
insurance in excess of the statutory limits, the policy limits will determine the maximum
liability. In Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983), the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of § 6-926.
97. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(d) (Smith-Hurd 1983) (tort claim limit of
$100,000 per claimant; limit does not apply to damages arising from operation of state vehi-
cle by state employee); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.035 (1979) (limit of $50,000 for any tort action,
exclusive of interest); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:4 (1983) ($100,000 limit for all damages
sustained by one person in a single incident or occurrence).
98. Noll v. City of Bozeman, 166 Mont. 504, 534 P.2d 880 (1975).
99. State ex rel. Byorth v. District Court, 175 Mont. 63, 572 P.2d 201 (1977).
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liability by prosecutorial immunity.
The major unsettled issue is what action the legislature will
take when the current damages limitation statute expires in 1985.
As other Montana commentators have noted, unlimited liability
for governmental entities is not a practical alternative. 00 There is
merit, however, to the argument that the legislature should in-
crease the amount of damages recoverable under the Tort Claims
Act.
By raising the statutory limitation for each claimant, the legis-
lature could protect the severely injured claimant who might not
be adequately compensated under the current scheme. The legisla-
ture should also increase the ceiling for each occurrence, because
governmental entities are often involved in activities that could
have serious repercussions on a large number of people.
Although these proposals might increase the burden on gov-
ernment, the legislature could adopt a provision, as was done in
California, 1 that permits a governmental entity to satisfy a claim
over a number of years. This would ease the economic burden on
the state treasury and on political subdivisions because they would
not have to bear the strain of satisfying a large judgment in one
payment. After all, the purpose of the Montana Tort Claims Act is
not to subject undue hardship on government, but to provide re-
dress for a person injured by a government tortfeasor.
100. See Comment, supra note 38, at 295-99; MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LIMITA-
TION ON THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1976).
101. In California, if a governmental entity demonstrates that it will endure unreason-
able hardship in satisfying a judgment, the court may require the governmental entity to
pay the judgment in 10 or less equal annual installments, with interest. CAL. GOV'T CODE
970.6 (West 1980).
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